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Abstract 
Liquidity risk is one of the major risks faced by banks in addition to credit risk, 
market risk and operating risk. In this paper we construct a stylized model of bank 
management where the asset and liabilities liquidity structure are a key element in 
determining the bank's exposure to liquidity risk. The main results of our model are 
that liquidity risk increases when competition in the credit market increases while 
increasing competition in the deposit market will decrease the liquidity shortage. Our 
results are of particular importance as banks face increased liquidity risk due to the 
recent developments in the financial markets. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The traditional functions of banks are transformation of maturity and the provision of 
liquidity. Banks transform short-term liquid liabilities into long term illiquid assets. 
Banks provide liquidity to demand depositors and also to borrowers via lines of 
credit.1 In doing that they are undertaking liquidity risk of their customers thus 
exposing themselves to this risk. In extreme cases bank liquidity problems can result 
in bank runs when depositors withdraw their funds on a massive scale, such problems 
can be contagious, spreading in the banking system. The classical role of the central 
band as a lender of last resort was supposed to serve as a buffer for this risk. More 
important today are the government provision of deposit insurance and capital 
requirements that should prevent a liquidity crisis and bank runs2. Recently in the 
summer of 2007 following the sub-prime crisis in the U.S. we have witnessed the 
return of the runs however this time the target has been not banks but asset backed 
securities. Investment funds that were leveraged and holding these assets were hurt by 
the “evaporation” of liquidity in the markets. 
Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) show that the function of banks as liquidity 
providers may explain why banks tie together the activities of deposit taking and 
lending under the same roof based on risk management motivation. Gatev, 
Schuerman, and Strahan (2006) test the KRS model and find that bank risk increases 
with unused loan commitments but the risk is mitigated by deposits. There is an 
incompatibility between the two activities: the timing demand for liquidity may force 
fire sale of illiquid assets. Bank deposits that are subject to runs (“fragile”) create an 
incentive for banks to provide liquidity, on the other hand capital requirements may 
reduce the liquidity creation by banks but increases their ability to overcome distress, 
see Diamond and Rajan (2001). 
Liquidity in banking is conventionally defined as the ability to fund increases in assets 
and meet obligations as they become due3. Liquidity involves uncertainty resulting for 
example from unexpected deposit withdrawals and or utilization of loan 
commitments.. Liquidity and liquidity risk have two related dimensions: first, funding 
liquidity is the ability to borrow in the market, accordingly funding risk as defined by 
                                                 
1 Fama (1985) argues that liquidity production makes bank unique and private information from 
deposits gives banks an advantage in lending 
2 For a now classical model of liquidity, bank runs and deposit insurance see Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983) 
3 Basel (2000) on sound practices for managing liquidity in banking organizations. 
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the Federal Reserve is the possibility that the bank will face difficulties in meeting its 
obligations as they come due because of increasing costs of new funds or of 
liquidating assets. The second dimension is market liquidity, the risk involved here is 
the possibility that the bank will not be able to sell or unwind its asset position 
without adversely affecting market prices due to market illiquidity. The first risk is 
more important in the context of maturity transformation in the banking book while 
the second risk is more important in the trading book. 
The bank acting as a risk bearing maturity transformer and provider of liquidity faces 
the usual trade-off between risk and return. Holding more liquid assets and better 
matching cash-flows of assets and liabilities will reduce the liquidity risk of the bank 
but also its profitability. Liquidity management involves finding the right balance 
between liquidity risk and profitability. 
There has been extensive academic and regulatory discussion of the different major 
banking risks: credit risk, market risk and even operational risk. However relative 
little attention has been paid to liquidity risk that has become one of the major risks 
faced by banks and other financial institutions in recent years. The Basel II Accord 
(2004) for example sets out regulatory standards for credit risk, market risk and 
operational risks but says little about liquidity risk. Recent developments in domestic 
and international financial markets such as globalization, deregulation and financial 
innovation have increased competition in these markets and enhanced financial 
instability. These developments have contributed to the increase in relative 
importance of liquidity risk a risk that cannot be hedged in the market. 
Liquidity is crucial to the viability of the bank and therefore managing it is among the 
most important activities of the bank. In this paper we present a model for the 
management of liquidity by the bank taking a (cash) flow approach to quantify 
liquidity risk. The model is stylized so that it can be solved and explicit results 
obtained. When considering the asset and liability structure of the bank a key issue is 
the distinction between liquid and illiquid assets and stable (core) vs. volatile 
liabilities. In the model for managing liquidity we relate liquid assets to volatile 
liabilities where the difference between liquid assets and volatile liabilities is the net 
liquidity position of the bank. The main result of our models is that: liquidity risk 
increases when competition in the credit market increases. This is consistent with 
recent increased liquidity risk faced by banks due to the developments in the markets 
mentioned above. 
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II. The Model 
 
Liquidity risk has two stochastic sides that is related to the likelihood of net 
repayment of liabilities (funding liquidity risk) and/or inability unwillingness to 
unwind their asset positions to meet short term obligations (asset liquidity risk). The 
probability of shifts in asset liquidity and liabilities structure will differ under normal 
business conditions, in an individual bank crisis when the bank’s access to liquidity 
may be restricted and in a general market crisis when marketability of assets 
deteriorates. 
Liquidity management involves primarily balancing the cost benefit trade-off between 
profitability and risk of illiquidity. A high level of liquidity, a bank holding a stock of 
high quality liquid assets (“liquidity warehouse”), indicates a capacity to meet 
liquidity needs and take advantage of business opportunities. However such assets are 
generally associated with lower returns and therefore too much liquidity in the form 
of cash and low-earning assets will reduce profitability. On the liability side banks 
raise core deposits (small demand deposits) that provide the bank a long term stable 
asource of funding but these may limit the growth of the bank. 
 
Our model is based on a static balance sheet of the bank ( we do not consider loan 
growth and deposit growth). For liquidity measurement and management we define 
liquid assets and volatile liabilities4. Liquid assets, considered as a primary source of 
liquidity, generally include excess cash (balances over and above those needed for 
daily operations) and deposits with other financial institutions; money market 
instruments and investment securities (designated as available for sale or trading and 
those maturing over the short term). The main assets of the bank are illiquid term 
loans. The two sources of debt funding of banks are retail deposits and wholesale 
funding. Many banks are increasing their use of wholesale funding to replace lost 
retail deposits or to keep up with loan growth that cannot be sustained by deposits.5 
                                                 
4 We follow the definitions of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) regulatory bulletin (2003) on 
liquidity on the dichotomy in the balance sheet on the assets and liability sides. 
5 In several European countries banks had to rely more on market financing and wholesale deposits to 
keep up with strong loan growth, see ECB (2002) study. 
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Retail deposits are received from the general public, individuals and small businesses 
and usually are fully insured.6 These “core” sources of funds are considered to be 
stable.  Volatile liabilities on the other hand include wholesale rate- sensitive deposits 
and short-term liabilities (market funding) that are sensitive to credit risk and market 
conditions causing them to be more volatile and pose greater liquidity risk to the 
bank. This “hot money” includes large uninsured deposits, repurchase agreements, 
federal funds, lines of credit with other financial institutions brokered deposits and 
other short term rate sensitive borrowings. 
The model is a single period model of liquidity management that relates liquid assets 
to volatile liabilities where the size of the bank is given and normalized to one, the 
initial balance sheet of the bank (at T=0) is in relative terms7:  
( ) ( ) ( )111 ββαα −+=−+
 
Where (1-α) is the proportion of liquid assets and (1-β) is the proportion of volatile 
liabilities. At time 0, the bank extends illiquid term loans that are paid off (mature) at 
time 1 (end of period). The interest rate on these loans is rL(α), we assume imperfect 
competition in the loan market that is the bank has some market power in this market 
due to geographic or industry concentration and thus the bank is facing a downward 
sloping  demand curve , thus 0<∂∂ αLr . In addition the bank holds liquid assets 
with a rate of return rs which are assumed to be trade d in a perfectly competitive 
market. The bank also has off-balance sheet assets in the form of loan commitments 
that are assumed to be a proportion λ of the loans α. A random fraction z ( )10 ≤≤ z of 
these commitments will be exercised at some random point in time t where 0≤t≤1. 
The bank is charging a fee φ on the unused commitments.  
The bank finances its assets by retail deposits, the bank is assumed to have some 
market power in this market which is assumed to be mostly a local market, and thus is 
facing an upward sloping supply curve. The rate paid on these deposits is r0(β) with 
00 >∂∂ βr  . The second source of financing is wholesale volatile funding on which 
the bank is paying a rate of r1 in a national or even international market and thus is 
assumed a perfectly competitive market (horizontal supply curve). We assume that a 
                                                 
6 In the U.S. they include demand deposits (DD), negotiable order of withdrawal accounts (NOW), 
Money-Market Demand Accounts (MMDA), saving accounts and certificate of deposits. These 
accounts usually maintain balances up to $100,000 to be fully insured by the FDIC. 
7 Size may be an additional choice variable however we assume that in the short run it is fixed. 
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random proportion y ( )10 ≤≤ y of these volatile deposits will be withdrawn at time t.8 
For simplicity we assume the same timing of the exercise of the loan commitments 
and withdrawal of deposits.9 
The bank finances the commitments that are taken down and deposits withdrawn by 
first drawing down its liquid assets (we assume no new deposits are raised beyond 
time 0). We define a random variable x which is the liquidity shortage (deficit): 
 
x = zλα+ (1-β) y - (1-α) = (α-β) + αλz-(1-y) (1- β).                                                (2)                                 
The liquidity shortage is composed of two parts, the liquidity gap (decisions of the 
bank) g= (1-β)-(1-α) =α-β that is the proportion of illiquid assets (loans) financed by 
volatile deposits and a random component, ω: 
 x= g+ω where ω= αλz-(1-y) (1- β).                                                    (3) 
The deficit x can be either positive or negative however we confine ourselves to the 
case where the bank is facing a non-negative expected liquidity deficit. This deficit 
will have to be financed by increasingly expensive sources of contingent funds that 
have an expected cost R(x).  These sources of funds may include borrowing in the 
money market, interbank borrowing and the usually more expensive borrowing from 
the central bank. 10As can be seen in (3) the bank’s liquidity position is determined in 
part by its two control variables: illiquid assets and its stable liabilities that is α and β 
and in addition we introduce uncertainty explicitly via the random variables z and y. 
Note that the impact of the two control variables on the liquidity deficit is not 
symmetric: ∂x/∂α>1 and ∂x/∂β >-1. That is to maintain its liquidity position the bank 
needs to raise more than $1 of stable deposits for each $1 of loans. This is because in 
our model loan commitments are a proportion of loans and thus are added to loans. 
       
The end of the period balance sheet of the bank (time T=1) is given by: 
α (1+zλ) = β+ (1-β) (1-y) +x                                                                                    (4) 
Note that it includes the financing of a liquidity shortage x. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Illiquidity may be interpreted as a signal of insolvency and can cause massive outflows of deposits. 
9 Empirical studies indicate that these variables are positively correlated. According to Gatev and 
Strahan (2006) these variables may have low positive or even negative correlation. 
10 These are the "discount window" borrowing from the Federal Reserve in the US and the standing 
facilities of the European Central Bank (ECB) in the EU. 
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The bank’s objective function is maximizing expected profits w.r.t. α and β: 
 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )[ ] ( )( ) )5(111)1()( 1111)( 10 txRtytrr
trztzr sL
−−−−+−−−
−−+−+−+=Π
βββ
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Where  t , z , y  indicate the conditional expected values of the respective variables; 
the expected cost R is assumed an increasing function of x, where the function is 
increasing at an increasing rate, i.e. R'(x)>0 and R"(x)>0.We assume that the bank 
operates within the efficiency zone so that at the optimum the expected liquidity 
shortage is not negative: ( ) ( ) 0111 >−−++= yzx βλα  
Combining the two first order conditions of βα andtrw ..Π  (See Appendix 
equations (A1) and (A2)) yields the equilibrium equation  
( ) ( )( ) ( )
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where α
αη L
L
r
dr
d−=  is demand elasticity for loans, and β
βε 0
0
r
dr
d=  is the elasticity of 
supply of retail deposits 
 
This equation equates the marginal revenues from loans and loan commitments (first 
term on the LHS) and from unused loan commitments (second term on the LHS) to 
the marginal cost of obtaining liquidity in the deposit markets (first term on RHS) and 
from selling liquid assets and obtaining contingent funds. The second order conditions 
hold globally (See Appendix (A3)-(A5)). 
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III. Comparative Statics Analysis 
In this section we perform comparative statics analysis of α and β and x   w.r.t the 
different parameters of the model. 
Consider a change in a generic parameter θ; we differentiate the FOC (see Appendix 
(A1) and (A2)) w.r.t θ: 
 
( )72
22
2
22
∆∂
Π∂
∂∂
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−=∆∂
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ββθα
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α
d
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d
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Using the second order conditions (See Appendix (A3)-(A5)) we obtain that 
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θαθ
α
∂∂
Π∂=∂∂
Π∂= sign
d
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d
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We now use (7) and (8) to analyze the effect of a change in the parameters of our 
model: η,ε, R, ϕ, tyz ,, , r1 on the decision variables α, β and the expected liquidity 
shortage x . First analyze the effect of the elasticity of the demand for loans η 
 
 
 
 
 
Combining (2) and (9) yields 0>∂∂ ηx that is an increase in the elasticity of demand 
for loans, that may result from an increase in competition in the credit market, will 
increase the expected liquidity shortage of the bank. As can be seen an increase in the 
elasticity affects the loans (α) but not the deposits of the bank (β):  increase in the 
proportion of loans on the banks balance sheet and hence an increase in its liquidity 
needs. Recent globalization and integration of financial markets may have such an 
effect of increased competition in the loan market that increases liquidity risk faced 
by banks. 
( ) ( )[ ]
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 Analyze now the effect of change in elasticity of the supply of the stable deposits ε 
on α, β and the expected liquidity shortage x  
 
( ) ( )1000
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2
0
2
2
>∂
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β
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Combining (2) and (10) yields 0<∂
∂
ε
x  
Thus, an increase in competition in the deposit market will increase the proportion of 
stable deposits without affecting the asset side of the balance sheet thus reducing the 
expected liquidity shortage of the bank. Recent deregulation especially in the US that 
removed geographical and product barriers on the activity of financial intermediaries 
has also increased competition in the markets where these firms raise funds, thus 
reducing the liquidity shortage in our model. 
Analyze now the effect of an increase in the fee charged on unused loan commitments 
φ. Since loan commitments are proportional to the amount of loans an increase in the 
fee will increase α without affecting β and thus increase the liquidity shortage:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We now analyze the effects of a change in the return on the liquid assets rs and the 
cost of volatile deposits r1 ; interestingly both have the same effect on the liquidity 
position of the bank 
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Thus an increase in r1 will increase β the proportion of stable deposits but will not 
affect α, and an increase in rs will reduce α, the proportion of loans, but will not affect 
β, so that an increase in both rates will cause the expected liquidity needs of the bank 
to decline. 
 
The comparative statics analysis yield ambiguous results with respect to the deposits 
withdrawls and loan commitments  yz,   . Therefore we assume for simplicity that the 
expected cost R is a linear function of x , i.e. R ( x ) =R x , where R is now a constant. 
From the first order conditions we obtain 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that yandz have positive direct effects on x  i.e., 
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The total effects however include also indirect effects via α and β 
( ) ( )1511
yd
dy
yd
xdandz
zd
d
zd
xd ββλαλα −−=++=  
The indirect effect of xonz is negative i.e. 0<
zd
dα  
If 
t
rR L −−⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −>
1
11 ϕη   (See (13)) . 
Also since 0>
yd
dβ  (See (14), the indirect effect of xony is always negative. Thus the 
total effects are positive if and only if the negative indirect effects do not offset the 
positive direct effects. The necessary and sufficient conditions for that is that the 
elasticities of ytrwandztrw ..)1(.. βα − are not too large. The specific conditions 
obtained from (15) are 
( )
( ) 11
1
1
<−
−
+< β
β
λ
λ
α
α y
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z
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zd
d  Note this will depend on the 
difference 1rR −  see (14). Following the Subprime crisis of 2007 in the US the 
Federal Reserve has reduced the cost of borrowing from its facility thus reducing R. 
This has reduced the elasticity (in absolute terms) of (1-β) w.r.t y . 
Empirical studies indicate that there is a positive correlation between yandz ; this will 
increase the effects of yandz  on x  since in this case another positive factor is added 
to the effects as follows 
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Finally consider an increase in R the cost of obtaining contingent liquidity, this will 
reduce the proportion of illiquid assets (loans) and increase stable deposits thus as 
expected reducing the expected liquidity shortage:  
 
 ( )
)17(0
00
001
2
2
<∂
∂⇒
>∂
∂⇒>=∂∂
Π∂
<∂
∂⇒<+−=∂∂
Π∂
R
x
R
y
R
R
z
R
β
β
αλα
 13
It should be noted that in general the effect of a change a random variable on the 
liquidity shortage of the bank is ambiguous. It will depend, among other things, on the 
cost of obtaining contingent liquid funds R relative to the cost of wholesale funds and 
relative to the marginal revenue from loans that is determined by the interest rate on 
loans and the elasticity of demand for loans.  
 
Insert Table 1 
 
The major results are presented in Table 1. Other results concerning market interest 
rates and behavior of depositors and borrowers are: a change in the return on the 
liquid assets rs and the cost of volatile deposits r1 will have a similar effect on the 
liquidity position of the bank but for different reasons. An increase in r1 will cause the 
bank to increase its stable deposits while an increase in rs will reduce the proportion 
of loans on the balance sheet of the banks. It should be noted that the random 
variables (z, y and t) have ambiguous effects on the liquidity position of the bank due 
to their direct as well as indirect effects on the optimal expected liquidity shortage. 
 
IV. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
An obvious trade-off exists between the risk and return of liquidity. The bank when 
transforming liquid liabilities into illiquid assets earns a profit on this activity, mostly 
reflected in the net interest income of the bank. On the other hand the bank is exposed 
to the risk (cost) of not having sufficient funds to meet its obligations. 
Within a stylized model that considers the cost and benefits of liquidity we show how 
the bank's optimal asset-liability management produces an equilibrium expected 
liquidity shortage. 
Comparative statics analysis with respect to the bank's competitive environment 
yields that increased competition in the credit market will increase the optimal 
liquidity shortage of the bank while increasing competition in the deposit market will 
reduce it. 
Our results are compatible with recent increased competition in capital markets due to 
globalization and deregulation of markets. It is of importance therefore that national 
and international (BIS Basel Committee) regulators pay more attention to liquidity 
risk. 
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Table 1: Summary Results of Comparative Statics Analysis 
 
 
Parameter/ 
Variable 
α β g x  
Elasticity of 
demand for 
loans η 
+ 0 + + 
Elasticity of 
supply of 
deposits ε 
0 + - - 
R Cost of 
contingent 
funds 
- + - - 
Fee on unused 
loan 
commitments 
ϕ 
+ 0 + + 
Interest rate on 
volatile 
deposits r1 
0 + - - 
Interest rate on 
liquid assets rs 
- 0 - - 
Exercise of 
loan 
commitments 
z  (R is high)* 
- 0 - - indirect effect 
 
+ total effect 
Withdrawal of 
deposits y * 
0 + - - indirect effect 
 
+ total effect 
 
*Positive correlation between yandz  will increase the positive effect total effects of 
these variables on x . 
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APPENDIX 
 
We now derive the first order conditions with respect to the two decision variables α 
and β 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) )1(01111111 ' AtzxRtrztzr sL =−+−−−+−+⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −=∂Π∂ λλϕληαα
 
where α
αη L
L
r
dr
d−=  is demand elasticity for loans 
And  
 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( ) )2(011111 '10 AtyxRtytrr =−+−−++⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ +−=∂Π∂ εββ
where β
βε 0
0
r
dr
d=  is the elasticity of supply of retail deposits 
 
The second order conditions hold globally: 
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